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I. Introduction
Deciding how best to secure and market intellectual property
rights is a critical decision. The timing of filing for a patent and
marketing a patented invention can heavily affect intellectual
property rights. Filing too early can lead to reduced profits if the
economically useful life of the patent will outlast the legally granted
patent monopoly. On the other hand, any one of several doctrines can
lead to a forfeiture of patent rights altogether for filing too late. One
such doctrine is the "on sale bar," which can invalidate a patent if the
invention was on sale more than one year prior to when the patent
application was filed.' Based on the policy judgments of Congress and
the courts, this doctrine continues to evolve, sometimes leaving
uncertainty and unfairness in its wake.
In an effort to bring greater certainty to patent rights, the
Supreme Court has held that the on sale bar doctrine is not satisfied
unless the "offer" rises to the level of a "commercial offer for sale"
and the invention is "ready for patenting., 2 Further, in evaluating
whether an offer rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, the
Federal Circuit has held that the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code apply.3
Do these rules bring certainty to patent rights? If so, does this
interest in certainty outweigh other policy goals, such as promoting
prompt disclosure4 or deterring the manipulation of the patent system
in an attempt to increase monopoly duration?5 The thesis of this note
is that the courts have been inconsistent in their formation and
enforcement of the on sale bar doctrine when viewed in light of its
stated policy goals. True, the current formulation of the on sale bar
has the potential to bring increased certainty in certain situations,
which the Court argues is an important factor in promoting
innovation.6 This greater certainty, however, comes at a greater cost
to the public in the form of greater monopoly profits for patent

1. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
2. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
3. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
4. Labounty Mfg., Inc. v. US Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
5. Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
6. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67; Chris J. Katopis, The Federal Circuit's Forgotten
Lessons?: Annealing New Forms of Intellectual Property Through Consolidated Appellate
Jurisdiction,32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 581, 589 (Spring 1999).
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holders.7 This note examines whether this current balance is
appropriate.
One area in particular where the courts have misapplied the
various policy considerations through the current formulation of the
on sale bar is in the area of patent licensing. Generally, an offer for a
license does not trigger the on sale bar because selling the rights
under a patent is not the same as commercializing the invention.8 In
today's economic climate of patent portfolios and widespread
technology licensing, however, should we not consider that in certain
commercial transactions a license should be considered a sale of the
invention? Under this perspective, treating a license as satisfying the
on sale bar comports with both the policies of the on sale bar and the
patent system in general.
Part I of this note overviews the history and current state of the
on sale bar. This section also briefly outlines the practical impact of
the on sale bar on commercial activity. Part II highlights the weakness
of the current on sale bar formulation and examines the motivations
for a new on sale bar test. Part III develops the policy of the on sale
bar as well as the general patent policy. With these policies in mind,
Part IV presents and analyzes two proposals. This note proposes
extending the on sale bar past rigid formulism to include activities
that attempt to commercialize an invention that is ready for
patenting. Further, this note proposes treating licensing agreements
as commercializing an invention such that the on sale bar would
apply.
II. Legal Overview and History
A. Patent Law Introduction
The Constitution grants Congress the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
in exercising this
Writings and Discoveries."9 Congress,
constitutionally granted power, granted inventors the right to exclude
others from practicing their invention" in exchange for full
7. See Winslow B. Taub, Blunt Instrument: The Inevitable Inaccuracy of an All-orNothing On-Sale Bar, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1493 (2004).

8. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 373 (1996).
10. Section 271(a) of the Patent Act states that "whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[28:81

disclosure." Congress grants this legal monopoly, however, only for a
limited duration, now twenty years from the date of filing a patent
application. 2
Because of the limited duration of a patent, the timing of filing
for a patent may have a significant impact on the profitability of a
patented invention. As such, inventors may take various approaches
in an effort to maximize the profits from an invention. Some
inventors may wish to file for a patent at the earliest possible stage.
Early filing may be advantageous where the inventor aims to attract
investment to fund the commercialization of the invention, to attract
potential licensees, or even to lower the risks associated with delaying
filing. Many inventions, however, require a certain amount of time to
bring an idea to market. Filing early thus has the disadvantage of
wasting a fraction of the legally granted monopoly duration. On the
other extreme, some inventors may never wish to file for a patent on
their invention, in effect using secrecy instead of patent law to secure
a competitive advantage. 3 This approach is flawed in many
commercial situations, however, because competitors can oftentimes
reverse engineer inventions and defeat the advantage of secrecy."
Thus, marketing the invention can destroy the secrecy of the
invention and lower the potential financial rewards."
Many inventors, however, fall in the middle ground. These
inventors wish to seek the protection of the patent system but aim to
reduce the impact of the limited patent duration. From the inventor's
perspective, an ideal approach would be to bring their invention to
market without patent protection and only file for a patent when
faced with competition. 6 Under this approach an inventor could
utilize strategic patent filing timing as an aid in maximizing the
effective patent duration and thus patent monopoly profits.
Legal and practical considerations, however, complicate this
ideal world. There can be significant risks to delaying a patent filing,
and strategically timing patent filings should not be attempted

the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(2000). A patent owner may proceed against an alleged
infringer in a civil action for an injunction to stop the infringing act and for damages
suffered as a result of the act of infringement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283-84 (2000).
11. Markman, 517 U.S. at 373.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
13. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265 (1979).
14. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989).
15. See id.
16. See Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000).,.
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without considering the possible negative consequences. Potentially,
an inventor could lose his/her patent rights entirely. Problems can
arise when a competitor files an earlier patent application on the
same invention,17 the invention is described in literature, ' progress in
the field makes the invention obvious, 9 the inventor exploits the

invention commercially in secrecy, 0 the invention is in public use,21 or
the invention is offered for sale.22 Further, inventors wishing to seek
international patent protection must consider the effect of activities
within the United States on their ability to obtain patent protection
overseasi 3 In spite of these risks, some inventors continue to delay
patent filing to the limits.24
B.

Statutory Basis of On Sale Bar

One specific risk to delaying filing stems from the on sale bar,
which can pose a significant barrier to patent rights. Section 102(b) of
the patent act states that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless
"the invention was.., on sale in this country, more than one year25
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.
This date, corresponding to one year prior to the filing date of the
patent application, is known as the "critical date."26
The on sale doctrine can be quite strict, leading to the loss of
patent rights even for sales beyond the intent or control of the

inventor. From the text of the statute, intent to place the invention on
sale is not a requirement of the on sale bar. 27 Rather, a sale can trigger
the on sale bar even without an appreciation that the invention has

17. See Lacotte v. Thomas, 758 F.2d 611 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the date of invention is
presumed to be date of filing unless the applicant can prove otherwise).
18. If the invention appears in a printed publication more than one year prior to the
date of filing, regardless of the actual date of conception, the patent will be invalid. 35
U.C.C. §102(b) (2005); see In Re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
19. Prior art used to determine whether the invention is obvious includes patents,
publications, and public uses prior to one year before the inventor filed for a patent.
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, Chapter 5, § 5.03[2][b] (1997).
20. Metallizing Eng'g v. Kenyon, 153 F.2d 516, 519 (2nd Cir. 1946).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
23. For example, in Europe and Japan any sale or of an invention before the filing of
patent application precludes patent eligibility. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET. AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 181 (2d ed. 2003).
24. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
26. Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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been placed on sale. 2' Furthermore, the text of the statute does not
require that the inventor himself place the invention on sale. 29 Thus,
"it is of no consequence that the sale was made by a third party," for
this will also trigger the on sale bar.30 Accordingly, if the inventor or a
third party sold, or offered for sale, the invention before the critical
date, then the patent may be invalid.
C.

Old Standard of "on sale"

Prior to 1998, the Federal Circuit evaluated whether an invention
was on sale under a "totality of the circumstances" test. 31 As the
Federal Circuit elaborated, a totality of the circumstances test that
incorporates policy considerations of the on sale bar is appropriate
because "the policies or purposes underlying the on sale bar, in effect,
define it.",32 In employing this test, the Federal Circuit considered such
factors as whether the invention was reduced to practice, the stage of
development of the invention, the nature of the invention, the factors
surrounding the sale or offer for sale, and the underlying policies of
the on sale bar. 33 The Federal Circuit treated the totality of the
circumstances test as a balancing test, with no single factor
determinative.m In following the totality of the circumstances test, the
on sale bar evolved to include "commercial activity which does not
35
rise to the level of a formal offer under contract law principles,
3 6 and
complete.
even sales of inventions that are only "substantially
D. Supreme Court Treatment: Pfaff v. Wells
Dissatisfied with the totality of circumstances test as well as the
substantially complete doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed the7
Federal Circuit's use of these doctrines in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics.
Noting criticism that the totality of the circumstances test is
"unnecessarily vague," 38 the Court stated that "a rule that makes the

28. Scaltech, 269 F.3d at 1330.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
30. Zacharin v. US, 213 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
31. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
32. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056,1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
33. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
34. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35. RCA, 887 F.2d at 1062.
36. Micro Chem., 103 F.3d at 1545.
37. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,_, 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
38. Id. at 66, n.11.
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timeliness of an application depend on the date when an invention is
substantially complete seriously undermines the interest in
certainty."39 Accordingly, the Court formulated a simpler "bright
line" test.4°
The Supreme Court held that the on sale bar applies when two
conditions are satisfied before the critical date. The invention must be
the subject of "a commercial offer for sale" and be "ready for
patenting.'4 The court abandoned the "substantially complete" test
and held that the on sale bar will only apply if the invention was
complete when offered for sale. Ordinarily, a "reduction to
practice.., provides the best evidence that an invention is
complete. 4 3 A reduction to practice, however, is not required and the
Court will regard an invention as complete when the "inventor ha[s]
prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were
sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention."'
E. Federal Circuit Treatment of the On Sale Bar
In Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., the Federal Circuit

elaborated on what constitutes a commercial offer for sale.4 ' The
Federal Circuit rejected the use of state law in determining what
constitutes an offer because such a rule would be "incompatible with
a uniform national patent system. 4 6 Looking for a national standard,
the Federal Circuit noted that the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") "has been recognized as the general law governing the sale
of goods and is another useful ... source in determining the ordinary

commercial meaning of terms used by the parties."47 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit will "look" to the UCC to define whether "a
communication or series of communications rises to the level of a
commercial offer for sale., 48 Not stopping with the UCC, the Federal
Circuit further indicated that it may also look to the Restatement of

39. Id. at 65-66.
40. Peter D. Sabido, Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.: The § 102(B) On-Sale
Bar Bright-Line Test of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. Just Got Brighter, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 583, 585 (2002).

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Pfaff,525 U.S. at 67.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 1047-48.
Id. at 1047.
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Contracts as a source of what constitutes an offer for sale.49
Accordingly, to determine whether an inventor's activities satisfy the
on sale bar, the Federal Circuit will look to the UCC and
Restatement of Contracts.
F.

Practical Impact; Patent Manipulation

The practical impact of the current formulation of the on sale bar
is that it allows inventors to easily manipulate the patent system. The
Pfaff formulation allows inventors to circumvent the limitations of
the on sale bar and begin building demand for their invention without
starting the patent clock." Inventors may advertise,51 give price
quotes," send product samples to potential customers," and even
license their invention 4 without triggering the on sale bar. Thus, by
carefully crafting their activities, inventors can choose from a wide
range of commercial activities aimed at increasing the demand for
their patented technology while falling just short of commercial offers
for sale.
An extreme example of such commercial activities falling just
short of the on sale bar can be seen in Linear Technology Corp. v.
Micrel.55 There, Linear Technology Corp. (LTC) manufactured silicon
chips involving switching regulator circuitry. Obviously with the
provisions of the on sale bar in mind, LTC "officially released" the
new product exactly one year prior to the filing date of their patent
application. Prior to the critical date, LTC engaged in a "marketing

49. Id.
50. Stephen Bruce Lindholm, Revisiting Pfaff And The On-Sale Bar, 15 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 213, 232-33 (2004).
51. In Linear Technology Corp. v. Micrel, the court held that "significant pre-release
efforts at commercialization and its targeted advertising to end-users" including
solicitation from customers about attitudes over possible pricing, publication of
preliminary data sheets, and publication of promotional did not constitute a commercial
offer for sale. 275 F.3d 1040, 1049-52 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
52. MLMC, Ltd. v. Airtouch Communications, 215 F. Supp.2d 464, 476-77 (D. Del
2002).
53. In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing.Co. v. Chemque, Inc., the Federal Circuit,
citing the Restatements definition of an offer, held that sending product samples to
potential customers "without providing any other terms, is not a commercial offer for sale,
because the recipient could not act in such a way that would create a contract." 303 F.3d
1294, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
54. See In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
55. 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
56. Id. at 1043.
57. Id. at 1045.
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blitzkrieg."5 This included "extensive pre-release marketing activity
designed to generate commercial interest in the chip."59 LTC
employed sales representatives, sent data sheets on the new product
to "potential customers," and even conducted a sales conference. 6 As
a result of this marketing activity, independent sales agents began
promoting the invention and customers began submitting purchase
orders.6 Although LTC did not immediately book these purchase
orders, they entered the orders in their computerized tracking
software under what LTC called a "will advise" category.62 When
LTC finally released the product, LTC filled the orders without any
further communication.63 In spite of all this commercial activity, the
Federal Circuit held that LTC's conduct did not trigger the on sale
bar.64
III. Problems With Pfaff
A.

Uncertainty in the Pfaff formulation

In spite of Pfaff's "bright line" approach, Federal Circuit
decisions concerning the on sale bar have left substantial uncertainty.
Recognizing this, in Linear Technology Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., the
Federal Circuit raised concerns with the approach advocated in
Group One.65 The first concern is that the UCC is only a model code.667
Accordingly, "no body of case law has explored its provisions.,
Instead, the relevant law is the UCC "as it has been enacted with
modifications in the several states."' Thus, the relevant case law from
which to interpret the UCC is that of the "state and federal courts
interpreting their individual versions of the UCC.' '69 Accordingly, to
craft the federal common law of contracts that Group One mandated,
the Federal Circuit will now look for the "common denominator" in
the relevant body of case law interpreting the various versions of the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 1044.
Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, 275 F.3d 1040, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1044-45.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
See d. at 1040.
Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, 275 F.3d 1040, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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UCC and Restatements as enacted by the states. ° Finding this
common denominator among the various bodies of case law is an
exceedingly complex analysis that leads to uncertainty at best.'
Further, on some issues of contract law, the various states directly
contradict, destroying the ability to determine a common
denominator at all.72 Thus, as one commentator puts it, "ex ante
predictability for inventors who are trying to decide when they need
to file their patent application is likely a dream."73 Accordingly, the
current formulation does not provide inventors the certainty to which
Pfaff aimed.

Another concern illustrated in Linear Tech. is that the UCC can
leave contract formation uncertain.74 Under Section 2-204(2) of the
UCC "[a]n agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may
75
be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
The official comments to the UCC indicate that "Section (2) is
directed primarily to the situation where the interchanged
correspondence does not disclose the exact point at which the deal
was closed, but the actions of the parties indicate that a binding
obligation has been undertaken. 7 6 Recognizing this problem, the
Federal Circuit declared that although "under the UCC, a valid
contract can be found even if the court cannot pinpoint the exact time
of its formation," this "cannot relieve the court in an on-sale bar
setting from ascertaining if a sale, or an offer for sale, has been made
before the critical date.

77

Thus, strictly following the UCC may place

inventors in the uncertain position of having formed a valid contract
without knowing if that sale occurred before the critical date.

70. Id.
71. Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability For The "Threat of a Sale": Assessing Patent
Infringement For Offering to Sell an Invention And Implications For The On-Sale
Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 782

(2003).
72. Because of direct conflict among the several states on certain issues of contract
law, engaging in the "common denominator" approach does not always yield results. For
example, states disagree as to whether the word "quote" creates an offer. See 1-2 Corbin
on Contracts § 2.5 (2005). Further, the Federal Circuit itself seems confused as to whether
price is necessary to form an offer. See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461,
1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir.
2001). Although the actual outcome of the case greatly depends on the facts of the case, no
definitive rules on these and other issues can be offered due to the variability in state law.
73. Holbrook, supra note 71, at 782.
74. Linear, 275 F.3d at 1052.
75. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (2005).
76. CHARLES L. KNAPP, RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 24 (Aspen Publishers 2003).
77. Linear,275 F.3d at 1052.
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Further uncertainty concerning the on sale bar springs out of the
Federal Circuits recent holding in Lacks Industries, Inc. v. McKechnie
Vehicle Components USA, Inc.78 There, the Federal Circuit again
supported the use of the UCC in determining whether commercial
activities rise to the level of an offer. 79 Despite spirited dissent, °
however, the majority in Lacks remanded and instructed the district
court to consider "course of dealing" and "industry practice" in
determining what constitutes an offer.8' Considering the course of
dealing and industry practice in determining whether a commercial
offer was made, however, further complicates the on sale bar analysis
and thus reduces certainty.' Indeed, the dissent in Lacks criticized the
use of "[s]uch industry-specific, local, and subjective criteria" and
denounced the majority opinion as "a regression toward the
imprecision of the discredited 'totality of the circumstances,' a
standard purposefully rejected by the Supreme Court in Pfaff v.
Accordingly, the holding of Lacks detracts from the
Wells."
objectives of Pfaff.
B.

Motivation to modify the Pfaffformulation

Certainty in patent rights is a lofty goal. In actuality, patent rights
be uncertain. Regardless of the clarity of the law, parties
always
will
must still interpret the law and apply the facts of their conduct to the
appropriate legal standard. As such, even sophisticated parties cannot
always determine whether their actions will rise to the level of a
commercial offer for sale or whether their invention was ready for
patenting. The use of the UCC and general contract principles has the
potential to bring greater certainty to patent rights."5 Even the use of
contract principles, however, can never completely bring light to the
shades of gray that constitutes real world conduct. This residual
uncertainty calls into question the reasoning of the narrow Pfaff
formulation. Further straining this flimsy emphasis on certainty is the
court's difficulty in articulating how much certainty actually

78. 322 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
79. Id. at 1347.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 1351-58 (Newman, J.,
81. Id.,at 1348.
82. See R. Jason. Fowler, Lacks v. McKechnie and the quest for on-sale bar certainty,
38 GA. L. REV. 1369 (2004).
83. Lacks, 322 F.3d at 1352 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See Fowler, supra note 82.
85. See Juan C. Gonzalez, The On-Sale Bar To Patentability: The U.S. Supreme Court
Sheds Some Light, 40 IDEA 83 (2000).
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contributes to innovation. In actuality, how much certainty in patent
rights contributes to innovation is exceedingly unclear. Accordingly,
certainty alone cannot justify the Pfaff formulation.
Besides the residual uncertainty infecting the Pfaff formulation,
Pfaffs heightened concern for certainty in patent rights is misplaced.
Because of many competing policy considerations, certainty in patent
rights is often only a secondary consideration.7 For example, even in
the context of the on sale bar, the courts and Congress could place a
higher emphasis on certainty by restricting the on sale bar to only
completed commercial transactions. This would limit the patent
holder's ability to commercialize the invention, while avoiding the
problem of determining what is an offer for sale. That the on sale bar
covers not just actual sales but offers as well, however, represents the
judgment that even offers for sale pose a risk to the patent system.'
Accordingly, even in the context of the on sale bar, where the Court
has recognized a heightened concern for certainty, courts and
Congress recognize there are competing considerations.
Further, other areas of patent law do not place such a high
emphasis on certainty. Indeed, the closest analogue to the on sale bar
uses the same totality of circumstances test rejected in Pfaff.89 The on
sale bar grew out of the public use doctrine. 90 The two doctrines,
codified in Section 102(b), are based on similar policy considerations
and were evaluated under similar tests.9' Until 1998, both doctrines
utilized a totality of the circumstances test. 2 Pfaff, however,
repudiated the totality of the circumstances test in the context of the
on sale bar. 93 Since that time, the Federal Circuit has continued to
utilize the totality of the circumstances test in the public use context94
86. Courts and Congress oftentimes cite certainty as promoting innovation without
discussing the extent of the contribution, in absolute terms or even in relation to other
contributions such as prompt disclosure. See Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 952 F.2d 1357,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
87. See Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
88. See infra Part III and accompanying text.
89. See Margaret L. Begalle, Seliminating The Totality Of The Circumstances Tests
For The Public Use Bar Under Section 102(b) Of The Patent Act, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1359 (2002).
90. See id. at 1362.
91. See id. at 1364-69.
92. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.,_525 U.S. 55, 66 n.ll (1998).
93. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
94. "We look to the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether there has
been a public use within the meaning of section 102(b). The totality of the circumstances is
considered in conjunction with the policies underlying the public use bar." Netscape
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while implementing the commercial offer for sale test in the context
of the on sale bar.95 This disparity is unjustified.
Another problem with the Pfaff formulation is that it places too
much emphasis on contract law. The policy of contract formation in
the context of a commercial offer for sale is to promote the
reasonable mutual intent of the parties.96 This, however, is not the
goal of the patent system. Rather, in patent law the actual intent of
the inventor is often irrelevant.9' This stems from the patent system's
goal of promoting the creation and disclosure of inventions, which
courts weigh against the actual intent of inventors. Accordingly,
placing so much emphasis on contract law in the context of the on
sale bar is misguided.
Finally, the current on sale bar formulation allows the wholesale
manipulation of the patent system. As seen in Linear Technologies, a
patent holder can engage in a wide range of commercial activities
without triggering the on sale bar.98 Besides a fundamental distaste for
what seems like the wholesale manipulation of the patent system,
whether this result is acceptable depends on the policy goals of the on
sale bar and the patent system itself.
IV. Policy Considerations
The mere recitation of "uncertainty" should not trump all other
policy considerations and justify a rule that detracts from the policy
goals of the on sale bar. Rather, we must carefully consider the
balance between the various policy goals of both the on sale bar and
the overall patent system. In so doing, the courts should place greater
emphasis on promoting prompt disclosure and preventing public
reliance. With such an approach, the balance of policy considerations
favors a broader application of the on sale bar.
A.

General Patent Policy

The appropriate starting point in any patent policy analysis must
be the general policy goals of the patent system. The overriding policy
goal of the patent system is to "encourage the creation and disclosure
of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design." 99

Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
95. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
96. Fellows v. Bd. of Tr. of Welborn Clinic, 63 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (D. Ind. 1998).
97. See Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
98. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
99. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
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Because nothing prevents an inventor from "keep[ing] his invention
secret and reap[ing] its fruits indefinitely" the patent system induces
disclosure by granting "the exclusive right to practice the invention
for a period of years."' ' ° This exclusive right to practice the invention
induces investment in innovation by granting inventors the possibility
of monopoly profits.'0 '
This general patent policy was the primary concern of the Court
in Pfaff.102 There, the court emphasized the importance of certainty in
patent rights.03 Certainty in patent rights limits risk associated with
the process of innovation, which consequently encourages investment
in innovation.' ° Accordingly, the certainty advanced through the
Pfaff formulation at least partly furthers the general patent policy.
Whether the net effect furthers the overall goals of the patent system,
however, can only be determined after also taking into account other
contributions to innovation as well as other policy considerations.
B. On Sale Bar Policy
Courts and commentators have outlined four primary policy
goals behind the on sale bar. The on sale bar seeks to promote
prompt disclosure and fairness to inventors while preventing public
reliance and impermissible patent extension.' 5 Mostly, the goals of
the on sale bar serve to reinforce the overall goals of the patent
system; however, this is not always the case. Accordingly, balancing
the goals of the on sale bar with the goals of the general patent system
forms the reasonable policy analysis of any on sale bar formulation.
The first policy goal of the on sale bar is to prevent the improper
extension of patent monopolies. °6 Courts are "concern[ed] that
patentees will commercialize their inventions while deferring the
beginning of the statutory patent term" until the onset of
competition. 1" If it were not for the on sale bar, by delaying filing for
a patent an inventor could reap the benefits of monopoly profits
100. Id.
101. Markman v.Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
102. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.,_525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998).
103. Id.
104. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737
(2002).
105. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Campbell Chiang, The "Commercial Offer for
Sale" Standard after Minnesota Mining V. Chamque, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV 1, 5
(2004).
106. Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255.
107. Id. at 1255 n.3.
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during two stages. Besides the duration of the patent, the inventor
could reap monopoly profits after the inventor has commercialized
the invention but before competitors have entered the market
themselves. Further, as the possible patent rights could deter
competitors from investing the necessary resources to enter the
market, this could extend an inventor's monopoly indefinitely.
Congress, however, in formulating the patent bargain established the
duration for legally granted patent monopolies at twenty years. 108 This
represents Congress' policy judgment that beyond this period the cost
to society outweighs its benefits. Accordingly, this policy goal seeks to
enforce the 20-year patent duration by preventing inventors from
improperly extending their patent monopoly.
A second policy goal seeks to prevent public reliance." An
invention "which appears publicly for a significant period of time
without an assertion of patent rights may justifiably le[a]d people to
believe that the product or process is not under patent protection."..
Accordingly, this justifiable belief that the invention is not under
patent protection may induce others to invest resources into
developing the product or process for their own use. "1' If the original
inventor subsequently acquires a patent and forecloses the second
inventor from practicing the invention then these resources will be
wasted.'1 2 As these resources could have been applied to innovation in
other areas this leads to a reduction in overall innovation, an effect
the patent system was formed to avoid.
A classic example of detrimental reliance based on the public
availability of an invention is seen in the case of Consolidated FruitJar Company v. Wright."3 There, an inventor sold a number of jars
without immediately filing for a patent."4 Not until several years later,
when the inventor noticed others selling the jars, did the inventor file
for a patent.1 5 By that time "[l]arge amounts of money ... ha[d] been
invested in the business of making and selling... [these] jars by

108.
109.

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1334.

110. Chiang, supra note 105.
111. Vincent J. Allen, The On Sale Bar: When Will Inventors Receive Some Guidance?,
51 BAYLOR L. REV. 125, 129 (1999).

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 129-30.
Consol. Fruit-Jar Company v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1876).
Id. at 93.
Id. at 95.
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various persons. ' " 6 Accordingly, by delaying filing, others
detrimentally relied on the public availability of the invention.
The third policy goal is to promote prompt and full disclosure of
inventions."7 Our patent system imposes a cost on society in the form
of legally granted monopolies in exchange for the creation and
disclosure of innovation."' Society benefits from this patent bargain
with the availability of new knowledge and technology."290
Accordingly, a faster rate of innovation increases the public benefit.'
Prompt disclosure serves this end by adding to the public knowledge
at an earlier stage. Further, prompt disclosure spurs additional
innovation based on the new public knowledge. The on sale bar aims
to promote prompt disclosure by creating a situation where delay
could foreclose patent rights altogether.
The final policy goal is fairness to inventors.' The one-year
grace period of the on sale bar grants inventors "a reasonable amount
of time following sales activity to determine whether a patent is
worthwhile.' ' 22 Not all inventors know at the time of conception
whether their patent will be a commercial success. The on sale bar
allows inventors to advance their inventions to such a stage that they
may perform a reasonable cost benefit analysis to123decide whether the
cost of prosecuting a patent is a good investment.
V. Proposals and Analysis
A. Proposal Overview
In light of Pfaff's residual uncertainty and the policy
considerations of both the on sale bar and general patent law this
note proposes a broader application of the on sale bar. This proposal
would apply the on sale bar to activities relating to commercializing
the invention, with commercializing defined broadly. Thus, under this
proposal communications to third parties regarding material features
of the invention that are not aimed at furthering the development of
the invention would trigger the on sale bar. The on sale bar would not

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 95-96.
In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Taub, supra note 7, at 1492-93.
Id.
Id. at 1493.
Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1334.
Id.
See Fowler, supra note 82 at 1375.
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trigger, however, unless the invention was ready for patenting.
Finally, this note would treat offers to license an invention as also
triggering the on sale bar. A complete transfer of patent rights,
however, would not trigger the on sale bar.
B.

Commercial activities and the on sale bar

The commercial offer for sale prong of Pfaff is too narrow and
should be replaced with a broader formulation. To formulate a
reasonable on sale bar test it is useful to evaluate the process of
innovation. Generally, the process of innovation can be divided into
two stages: technological development and commercializing the
invention. These stages can and often do overlap. Technological
development includes such activities as the process of conception and
reduction to practice followed by initial manufacturing. In contrast,
commercializing the invention includes such traditional activities as
sales and offers for sale as well as activities reasonably calculated to
increase demand for the technology. This may include advertising,
sending product samples, or soliciting future orders without the
present intention to fill them. This is a useful distinction in the
context of the on sale bar and can lead to a more appropriate
formulation.
Using this distinction, a new proposal would hold that
communications to third parties regarding material features of the
invention which are not aimed at furthering the development of the
innovation would trigger the on sale bar. This formulation includes
traditional on sale bar activities of offers for sale but is also broad
enough to encompass such non-traditional on sale bar activities as
advertising, which are merely communications intended to reach
potential customers to stimulate demand for a product or service.
Because the main concern that this test aims to address, however, is
the effect of potential reliance on third parties, the test would not
trigger the on sale bar unless the communication involves material
features of the invention. A communication relates to material
features if it relates to a patentable feature of the invention. Further,
the communication must contain sufficient information to enable
reliance. Accordingly, the communication must be sufficiently
detailed to facilitate copying or duplicative research rather than
merely inspiring independent innovation. Accordingly, such
advertisements that merely communicate trivial information, like the
name of the product or company, would not trigger the on sale bar.
Further, because another concern is not to hinder innovation,
under the proposed test, communications for the purposes of
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developing the invention or the resultant product would not trigger
the on sale bar. The example of communications to third party
manufacturers highlights this distinction. Under the proposed
standard, communications with manufacturers would not trigger the
on sale bar if for the purposes of contracting the manufacture of the
invention, as this would be a necessary step in bringing the product to
market. If the manufacturer, however, were a potential customer then
the communications would trigger the on sale bar. Another example
is communications to consumers. A communication to consumers
intended to stimulate demand, such as an advertisement, would
trigger the on sale bar under the proposed test. Communications with
consumers regarding market research, however, would not trigger the
on sale bar as such communications are intended to aid in bringing
the invention to market rather than merely increasing demand for the
invention.'24
To further illustrate the proposed standard, the facts of Linear
Technologies are a useful guide. Under the proposed standard,
activities such as employing sales representatives and providing these
representatives with the specifications of the invention would not
trigger the on sale bar as these do not constitute communications to
third parties. On the other hand, the "marketing blitzkrieg" by these
sales representatives to third parties concerning the invention would
trigger the on sale bar. Not only were these communications to third
parties, but they communicated material features of the invention and
were not for the purposes of furthering the development of the
invention. The "marketing blitzkrieg" was merely calculated to
increase the demand for the invention, an attempt to further the
commercialization of the invention rather than merely furthering its
development.
Of course, there will be tough cases that fall somewhere between
marketing blitzkrieg and innocent or non-material communications.
In such cases, consideration of reliance and fairness to inventors must
control. An example of one such tough case is press releases
regarding innovation. It is possible that an inventor could craft a press
release that would convey sufficient information to enable reliance
without rendering the patent invalid through the prior publication
rule. Although a reasonable company would expect the original
inventor to file for a patent based on the announced innovation, press

124. Note, however, that if the communication regarding market research is
sufficiently detailed then this could constitute a public use, which could invalidate the
patent.

2005]

REFORMULATING THE ON SALE BAR

releases normally do not convey the bounds of the intellectual
property right. Thus, regardless of reasonable expectations, such a
press release could induce a company to explore the area, hoping to
find room to operate outside the bounds of the yet to be filed patent.
This could create duplicative research and a waste of resources. One
issue with press releases is that it is not clear whether the company
intends to increase demand for the announced invention or merely
intends to increase the stature of the company in the public's eye.
Regardless of the motives, however, the potential for reliance by
others is the same. Accordingly, press releases should also trigger the
on sale bar.
1. ProposalPolicy Analysis
Comparing this proposed test to the Pfaff standard illustrates its
fit within the patent system. The proposed test is prudent because it
allows inventors to engage in valid and honest efforts to prepare the
invention for commercialization while preventing the wholesale
manipulation of the patent system. Although the proposed test does
face slight concerns over uncertainty and fairness to inventors, other
policy considerations support this broader approach. In particular, the
proposed test's biggest advantage is that it may promote the more
efficient allocation of resources towards innovation, thus increasing
innovation and the public benefit of the patent system.
a.

Prompt Disclosure

The courts have often emphasized that one goal of the patent
system as well as that of the on sale bar is prompt disclosure.125 In
spite of this, prompt disclosure, by itself, is not dispositive on the issue
of altering the Pfaff formulation of the on sale bar rule. Though
important, prompt disclosure is not a requirement of the patent
system. 1 6 Nonetheless, courts and commentators often mention
prompt disclosure as a policy consideration justifying various patent
doctrines. 2 ' Often, however, prompt disclosure is only one of a
cornucopia of policy considerations."'
Prompt disclosure, however, does contribute to the new rule's
justification. The court in Pfaff primarily based its holding on the

125.

In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

126. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
127.
128.

Kollar,286 F.3d at 1334.
Id.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[28:81

detrimental effect of uncertainty on innovation. 9 We cannot ignore,
however, that a delay in disclosure, here brought on by an excessively
narrow formulation of the on sale bar, also reduces innovation by
delaying public access to knowledge that can lead to add on
inventions. The increase in innovation brought on by a formulation
that induces prompt disclosure would therefore help offset a decrease
in innovation due to uncertainty or reduced inventor profits.
Accordingly, the prompt disclosure advanced by the proposed
formulation supports its use over the Pfaff formulation.
b.

Reliance by Other Inventors

The greatest impact of the proposed rule would be reliance by
other inventors. The current formulation allows inventors to create
public awareness for their invention through extensive marketing
activities without triggering the on sale bar. 3 ° There is no reason to
assume that these marketing activities are less likely to create public
awareness than commercial offers for sale.' Rather, each is likely to
create public awareness for the invention and thus the potential for
detrimental reliance on the part other inventors. By starting the on
sale bar clock at a lower threshold of commercial activity, the
proposed test would reduce the chance that other inventors will
become aware of the technology and duplicate its development. The
result is that the proposed rule would improve resource allocation
and allow inventors to better allocate their scarce resources to real
innovations, rather than inadvertent duplicative technologies. Thus, a
lower on sale bar threshold would provide a patent system with a
greater public benefit due to improved resource allocation.
c.

Certainty

One significant policy concern with any on sale bar formulation
is that of certainty in patent rights.'32 The proposal to modify the on
sale bar to prohibit broader activities than commercial offers for sale
is no less certain than the Pfaff formulation. Although the proposed
test is broader than the Pfaff formulation, we should not confuse a
broader application with uncertainty. Although defining what is a
material feature of the invention or what constitutes sufficient
information to enable reliance by third parties may seem difficult for
129. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.,_525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998).
130. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
131. See Heather Colburn & Julie Vanderzanden, Commercial Exploitation Through
Competitive Advantage, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, September 2002, at4, 4-5.
132. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65-66.
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some gray area cases, applying legal rules to real world conduct
always involves gray areas. This reality is no less true with the
application of the UCC, where searching for a "common
denominator" among the case law of the several states creates
substantial uncertainty. If anything, the lower on sale bar threshold of
the proposed standard advances certainty by placing inventors on
notice that communications with third parties concerning the
invention will trigger the on sale bar regardless of whether the
inventor satisfied the formalities of a commercial offer for sale.
Accordingly, although troublesome, this residual uncertainty does not
counsel against the proposed rule.
d. Fairness to Inventors
Another significant policy concern with any on sale bar
formulation is that of fairness to inventors.'33 The proposed rule to
modify the on sale bar to prohibit attempts to increase demand for an
invention is not unfair to inventors. The on sale bar's policy
consideration of fairness to inventors seeks to grant inventors the
opportunity to explore commercial exploitation of their invention
before weighing the benefits of patent protection against the costs of
obtaining the patent.134 By triggering the on sale bar at a lower
threshold the proposed rule reduces the inventor's ability to perform
such cost benefit analysis. To say that a broader application of the on
sale bar would deprive inventors of a reasonable amount of time to
judge the commercial success of an invention, however, would ignore
the grace period built into the on sale bar. This grace period
adequately secures a reasonable amount of time to the inventor to
judge commercial success, especially because the proposed rule would
only trigger the on sale bar for commercial activities. Furthermore, in
at least some applications of this rule the idea that inventors utilize
the grace period to judge commercial success is misplaced. The cost of
advertising, for example, can easily dwarf the costs of securing patent
protection. Thus, in such cases, inventors perform the relevant costbenefit analysis before marketing activities even begin. Accordingly,
fairness to inventors is not a major problem for the proposed rule.

133.

In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

134.

See Fowler, supra note 82, at 1375.
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Patent Reward

Along with certainty, the anticipated return on investment
contributes heavily in inducing innovation.135 Here, compared to the
proposed standard, the Pfaff test allows greater return on investment
because it allows commercial marketing that creates more efficient
use of the patent duration. Although a reduced patent reward may
reduce overall innovation, this is not fatal to the proposed standard.
The on sale bar is primarily concerned with avoiding manipulation of
the patent system leading to a delay in disclosure and a detriment to
other inventors, not the extent of the patent bargain. The patent
bargain represents Congress' judgment as to when patent monopolies
become a greater burden than a benefit. Thus, the proper solution as
to the extent of the patent bargain should not emanate from the on
sale bar, but the patent duration itself. Therefore, in this context, the
court should not tailor the on sale bar to take account of the patent
quid pro quo. Accordingly, a lower patent reward does not counsel
against the proposed formulation.
f.

Summary

A broader rule that allows activities to trigger the on sale bar
whenever the invention was subject to attempts to commercialize the
invention would more effectively serve the policy goals of the on sale
bar while maintaining certainty and fairness to inventors. Certainty is
preserved because an inventor would just as likely perceive instances
of attempted commercialization of an invention as they could
determine what interpretation of the UCC controls their offer for
sale. Further, fairness to the inventor is not sacrificed, as the one-year
grace period sufficiently addresses this concern. In support of the new
proposal, the proposed rule would promote prompt disclosure by
triggering the on sale bar at an earlier stage in commercialization.
Lastly, and most significantly, the new proposed rule would prevent
wasted resources, as fewer inventors would invest in commercializing
inventions that are seemingly in the public domain.
C.

Ready for Patenting

Unlike the "commercial offer for sale" prong of Pfaff, the "ready
for patenting" prong adequately weighs the policy goals of the
general patent system with the policy goals of the on sale bar.
135. See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to
Encourage Conventional PrescriptionDrug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce
ProductLiability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1017 (Winter 1994).
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The ready for patenting test minimizes delay in disclosure while
remaining fair to inventors. The on sale bar favors prompt
disclosure.'3 6 Although the ready for patenting test allows some delay
before disclosure out of fairness to inventors, it sufficiently minimizes
this delay. In light of fairness to inventors, this delay is permissible.
To that end, the Federal Circuit noted, "[i]t was never the purpose of
section 102(b) to force premature entry into the patent system upon
inventors who are still developing their inventions."'37 To minimize a
delay in disclosure, the Pfaff test sets the on sale bar standard such
that once a patent advances to a stage such that an inventor could
apply for a patent, then the on sale bar clock may start.'3 8 As the Pfaff
test only allows the on sale bar to trigger when the invention is ready
for patenting, however, it does not force inventors to enter 1the
39 patent
invention.
their
developing
legitimately
still
are
who
system
This "ready for patenting" test also promotes other policy goals
of the on sale bar and the general patent system. Because the current
formulation minimizes the delay in disclosure, it appropriately
minimizes the public's reliance on an invention and limits the degree
to which the patent duration may be improperly extended while
remaining fair to inventors. Furthermore, the ready for patenting test
avoids deterring investment through uncertainty because it limits the
possibility of triggering the on sale bar before an inventor is even able
to successfully obtain a patent. Accordingly, the ready for patenting
test appropriately furthers the policy goals of the general patent
system as well as the on sale bar.
The ready for patenting test, however, has been the subject of
considerable criticism. Some commentators have advocated lessening
this "ready for patenting" standard, reasoning it is too harsh.'" In its
place, these commentators have advocated that an offer for sale
should not trigger the on sale bar unless the invention is advanced to
such a stage that it is "commercially marketable' 4' or able to be

136. Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1334.
137. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Although
proclaimed under the more stringent totality of circumstances test, this statement carries
even more force under the more lenient "ready for patenting" test.
138. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.,_525 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1998).
139. See id. at 66.
140. Katherine E. White, A
Patent Cases, 88 KY. L.J. 423
Electronics, Inc.: Amorphous
Patentability, 27 N. KY. L. REV.

141.

General Rule of Law is Needed to Define Public Use in
(Winter 1999-2000); Darran D. Winslow, Pfaff v. Wells
Boundaries for the Analysis of the On-Sale Bar to
1071 (2000).

Winslow, supra note 140.
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reduced to practice.'42 Other commentators, however, have criticized
the ready for patenting approach as too lenient. They would treat all
offers for the sale of a later claimed invention as satisfying the on sale
bar, regardless of the state of development.' 3 These approaches fail to
balance the policy goals of the on sale bar and the patent system in
general. A rule that allows the inventor to delay patenting his
invention until it is commercially marketable or able to be reduced to
practice delays disclosure and creates the possibility of public reliance
on the availability of the invention. On the other hand, a rule that
treats all commercial activity as being able to trigger the on sale bar,
regardless of patentability, will detract from certainty and will deter
investment in innovation. The Pfaff "ready for patenting" test,
however, represents a middle ground that seeks to balance certainty
against prompt disclosure, public reliance, and fairness to the
inventor.
D.

Licensing

1. Background and Proposal
One area of the on sale bar that specifically misapplies the policy
considerations of the on sale bar is the on sale bar as applied to
license agreements.'" The general rule has often been stated that "an
assignment or sale of the rights in the invention and potential patent
rights is4 5not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section
102(b)."'
The application of the on sale bar to licensing has become
increasingly murky, however, since the Federal Circuit's decisions in
In Re Kollar'" and Minton v. National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc.147 These cases demonstrate that whether a sale involving
a license will trigger the on sale bar will be highly dependent on the
factual circumstances. In Minton, the Federal Circuit held that a lease
of a computer program that was capable of practicing the steps of a
later claimed method along with a license to practice the later claimed
method was sufficient to satisfy the on sale bar.'4 8 In Kollar, however,
142. White, supra note 140.
143. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
144. See Chiang, supra note 105.
145. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
146. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
147. Minton v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373 (Fed Cir. 2003).
148. Id.
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the Federal Circuit held that an offer of a license to practice a later
claimed process along with the transfer of "know how" to practice the
later claimed process did not trigger the on sale bar.149 The court in
Kollar distinguished situations such as in Minton by arguing that a
"sale of an interest that entitles the purchaser to possession and use of
an embodiment of an invention that is unrelated to any patent" would
trigger the on sale bar.'50 Accordingly, a sale of a device capable of
performing the patented process would trigger the on sale bar while a
license to practice a patented process would not."'
Recognizing this confusion, as well as policy considerations of
the on sale bar, the court should treat license agreements as triggering
the on sale bar. To limit this proposal's effect on innovation, however,
a complete transfer of patent rights should not trigger the on sale bar.
2. Justificationfor Proposal
There are three main justifications for the proposal to treat
license agreements as triggering the on sale bar. The first justification
for the proposed formulation is that it does not depend on whether
the invention requires additional development for commercialization.
Unlike the proposed formulation, the current treatment of the on sale
bar as applied to licenses considers whether the process required
additional development.'52 The court in Kollar stated "[w]e hold only
that licensing the invention, under which development of the claimed
process would have to occur before the process is successfully
commercialized, is not such a sale."' 53 Was this reference to the ability
to commercialize the invention mere dictum or was it central to the
holding in Kollar? If it was central, then would a license of a
commercially marketable process along with the requisite know how
trigger the on sale bar? The Supreme Court in Pfaff, however, in
deciding when an invention was sufficiently advanced that it could
trigger the on sale bar, was not concerned with whether the invention
was capable of commercialization.'54 Rather, the Supreme Court
formulated its rule based only on whether the invention was ready for
patenting.' Accordingly, the current formulation is inconsistent with
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
140.
155.

Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326.
Id. at 1331.
Id.
In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id.
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.,_525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998).; see also Winslow, supra note
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
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the ready for patenting prong of Pfaff. The proposed standard,
however, does not consider whether an innovation is capable of
successful commercialization, only whether the innovation is ready
for patenting. Accordingly, the proposed standard is truer to the
ready for patenting standard applied in Pfaff.
Another justification of the proposed standard is that it
accurately treats licenses as commercializing the invention. One
significant problem of the current formulation stems from the court's
treatment of a license as not commercializing the invention." This is
flawed in many commercial contexts. First, should not the structure of
the license agreement determine whether the inventor is
commercializing the invention? For example, a license agreement that
includes up-front payments for the use of the invention seems
sufficiently analogous to the sale of a patented product to constitute
commercialization. The Federal Circuit, however, has noted that even
up-front payments will not trigger the on sale bar.'57 True, a license to
a manufacturer for a process is not a sale of an end product to a
consumer. The Federal Circuit, however, does not require sales to a
consumer to trigger the on sale bar.' Indeed, sales from a supplier to
a manufacturer will satisfy the on sale bar. 9 This distinction is
unjustified. Whether it is a license for a process or a sale of a
component, the effect on the inventor is the same. In each case, the
inventor utilizes their invention for financial gain. Accordingly, the
treatment of a license as not commercializing the invention is
misguided and does not justify the current formulation of the on sale
bar as applied to license agreements.
The final justification for the proposed standard is that it
promotes the policy goals of the on sale bar and the general patent
system by promoting prompt disclosure, limiting the effect of
detrimental reliance, reducing the extension of patent duration
through the manipulation of patent rules, and reducing uncertainty.
The lenient approach of the current formulation unnecessarily delays
disclosure by allowing commercial activities to fail to trigger the on
sale bar. Further, because of this delayed disclosure and the ability to
operate commercially without triggering the on sale bar, the current
formulation results in a greater potential for detrimental reliance.
Although the court in Kollar argued that the license agreement in
156. The court in Kollar argues that "the grant of a license, albeit accompanied by
some payment, only part of the pre-commercialization process." Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1334.
157.
158.
159.

Kollar,286 F.3d at 1334.
See Special Devices, Inc. v. Oea, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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that case did not enable the public to reasonably rely on the free
availability of the invention, the court gave no indication of a
different result if detrimental reliance could have or actually did
occur. 160 Moreover, the current formulation may also allow the
inventor to extend the monopoly duration, at a greater cost to the
public. For example, a licensing agreement that provides the inventor
with up-front and running payments could last longer than the
statutory period.
The proposed rule also serves the policy goals of the patent
system because it can actually bring greater certainty to patent rights.
Because either the sale of the invention16 1 or the sale of a product
made with a patented process 62 may trigger the on sale bar, including
sales by licensees, under the current approach the licensor must
ensure that the licensee's activities do not trigger the statutory bars.
To prevent this would require the licensee to disclose all relevant
activities, which they may not wish to do and may not fully cooperate
with. Thus, an inventor risks inadvertent on sale bar invalidity
through the conduct of licensees.6 6 Thus, the current formulation
creates unnecessary uncertainty. The proposed formulation, however,
would reduce uncertainty by eliminating the possibility of licensees
triggering the on sale bar. Accordingly, because a formulation that
triggers the on sale bar for license agreements would increase prompt
disclosure, decrease public reliance, reduce the ability to improperly
extend patent duration, and decrease uncertainty in patent right,
policy considerations favor the proposed standard.
3. Balancing the Need for Innovation
'One concern for this broader rule that treats license agreements
as triggering the on sale bar is the effect on innovation. In Kollar, the
court noted that not holding licensing agreements as sales "furthers
the objective of making inventions available to the public." '64 This
allows "inventors to place their inventions into the hands of parties
that are in a better position to commercialize the invention" without

160. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
161. See Zacharin v. US, 213 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
162. Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1333.
163. Although the Federal Circuit has not indicated whether they will provide an
exception for such an occurrence, strict adherence to the on sale bar doctrine likely
indicates that no exception will be provided. For example, in Evans Cooling Systems. v.
GMC, the court held that even an invention that was misappropriated and sold would still
trigger the on sale bar. 125 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
164. Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1334.
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fear of triggering the on sale bar.'65 To allow such cooperative
development and commercialization of invention, the proposed rule
should not trigger the on sale bar when the transaction involves a
complete transfer of patent rights. A complete transfer of patent
rights, such as an assignment from a researcher to his employer, is
often necessary to the commercialization of the invention. It would
also be fair to small inventors who must transfer patent rights to
commercialize the invention. This limitation, however, does not
ignore the possibility of detrimental reliance that occurs with
commercial transactions involving unpatented inventions. Thus, the
distinction between complete transfers and partial transfers of patent
rights appropriately balances the goals of the on sale bar, such as
preventing detrimental reliance, with the goal of promoting
innovation. Accordingly, although a partial transfer of patent rights
should trigger the on sale bar, a complete transfer should not.
4.

Summary

Recognizing the weaknesses of the current formulation, the court
should treat offers for licenses as triggering the on sale bar. This
approach would be more faithful to the principles of the on sale bar.
Whether the commercialization is in the form of a sale or in a license,
the problem of reliance by other inventors would be the same. In
addition, treating offers for licenses would promote prompt disclosure
and would guard the interest in certainty. It will also prevent
inventors from improperly manipulating the patent system to increase
their effective patent duration. Finally, allowing complete transfers of
patent rights as not triggering the on sale bar would guard against
deterring innovation by small inventors.
VI. Conclusion
The current formulation of the on sale bar does not sufficiently
balance the competing policy interests of the on sale bar and the
patent system in general. Placing a higher emphasis on prompt
disclosure and avoiding detrimental reliance, this note advocates a
broader formulation of the on sale bar. A careful balance of policy
considerations supports this note's proposed rule, which would apply
the on sale bar to commercial activities designed to increase demand
for an invention that is ready for patenting. Further, policy
considerations support applying the on sale bar license agreements as
well.
165.
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